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cialton Juvenile Justice Standards (IA-ABA Standards or Standards)1 has renewed
debates2 about juvenile justice. This article examines one aspect of that dia-
logue, the function of criminal law responsibility principles in juvenile delin-
quency doctrine. The use of infancy, insanity, and diminished capacity
defenses are analyzed in relation to delinquency doctrine and practices.
Section II reviews the foundations of juvenile justice philosophy. Case
law examples are used to illustrate the incongruities between criminal law
and juvenile justice. Section III presents an overview of the criminal respon-
sibility doctrines. Section IV explores the adaptation of these doctrines to
delinquency adjudication. The final section sets forth the recommended the-
ory for integrating the responsibility principles into delinquency
jurisprudence.
II. JUVENILE COURT PHILOSOPHY
Divergence of juvenile justice doctrine from the adult criminal justice
system is undisputed.3 Abundant historical evidence indicates that the juve-
nile court was intended to liberate the child from the punitive aspects of the
adult system.
4 
Relaxed procedural requirements structured to promote re-
habilitation of the minor
5 became a normative feature of the delinquency
system. As the juvenile court matured, however, critics increasingly cited
due process deficiencies as a cause of juvenile injustice. The courts re-
sponded by incorporating certain adult due process rights into delinquency
adjudication.
6
1. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION - AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS (1982) [hereinafter STANDARDS]. The standards are reported in multiple
volumes organized by substantive topics, e.g., IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY AND SANcTIONS. For a history of the project and a summary of its product, see
B. FLICKER, IJA-ABA STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (2d
ed. 1982).
2. Drafting the recommended principles for the IJA-ABA STANDARDS was rife with con-
flict. The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, for instance, vehemently opposed many
project recommendations, especially those aimed at eliminating distinctions between juvenile
and adult procedures. See Fox, Philosophy and the Principles of Punishment in the Juvenile Court, 8
FAM. L.Q. 373, 373 n.l (1974).
3. See Fox, supra note 2; Zimring, PursuingJuvenile Justice.- Comments on Some Recent Reform
Proposals, 55 J. URB. L. 631 (1978). For an historical perspective, see Fox, JuvenileJustce Reform.-
An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970); Schultz, The Cycle ofJuvenile Court History,
19 CRIME & DELINQ. 457 (1973). See generally Note, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104
(1909) (classic exposition of early juvenile court doctrine).
4. See Fox, supra note 3, at 1187 (challenges the revisionist views of A. PLATT, THE CHILD
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969)); but see A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE
INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977). See Schultz, supra note 3, at 459-72 (reconciles the
Fox-Platt theories).
5. Delinquency doctrine has supported the proposition that the salient treatment needs of
the juvenile require informal adjudicatory rules. It was believed that the formalism of the crim-
inal court interfered with the benevolence of intervention. Additionally, jurisdictional authori-
ties have been broadly defined to encompass assorted disapproved activities. For example,
"status" conduct, such as truancy, incorrigibility, and promiscuity permitted official interven-
tion. As observed by Fox, supra note 2, at 378: "[T]he commission of crime was the opportunity
to save a young life-the nature of the crime was inconsequential."
6. See Schultz & Cohen, Isolationism in Juvenile Court Jurisprudence, in PURSUING JUSTICE
FOR THE CHILD 20-42 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976); McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatoty Rights in Juvenile
Court: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457 (1981); Rosenberg, The
Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime.- Proposalfor a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27
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Current ground rules of juvenile justice are governed by the landmark
case of In re Gault.7 In Gault, the Supreme Court criticized the informality of
the juvenile court and announced that the basic due process protections for
adults, the fourteenth amendment and the Bill of Rights, applied to chil-
dren.8 The Court adopted an analytic framework for evaluation of the con-
stitutional rights of juveniles and made it clear that the laudatory
rehabilitative emphasis of juvenile justice would not prevent scrutiny of pro-
cedural and substantive rules. Although the Court has not required the
identical adult protections for the adjudication of delinquents, 9 the Gault
concept has become the dominant influence in juvenile court jurispru-
dence. 10 In the post-Gau/t era, juvenile rights are evaluated by reference to
both the unique characteristics of the juvenile justice system and to the con-
stitutional mandates of the adult system.
Thus, describing the essence of juvenile justice is a slippery task because
of the system's unique values and procedures." At a minimum observers
agree that the juvenile court combines civil and criminal law principles to
promote the "best interests" of the child and the community.' 2 Social con-
trol objectives are undeniably present, supported byparenspatriae and police
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 656 (1980). Schultz and Cohen evaluate the distinctions, searching for a new
direction. Although inclined initially to recommend abolition of the juvenile court, the authors
propose a more moderate conclusion: "What does need to be abandoned is whatever isolates
the juvenile court from the mainstream of jurisprudence, which includes criminal law and civil
commitment law." Schultz & Cohen, supra at 41. The IJA-ABA STANDARDS project, supra note
1, with which Schultz and Cohen were affiliated, reflects that ideology.
7. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. Id at 13.
9. Although lower courts have at times assumed that Gault required a "functional equiva-
lence" of the adult protection, Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 660-718 shows that subsequent
Supreme Court doctrine indicates otherwise. See also infia note 117. Notwithstanding the evolu-
tion of that doctrine, lower courts continue to cite Gault as commanding equivalence within the
juvenile justice system and this erroneous perspective is often labeled as "a Gault analysis." In
fact, as observed by Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 660-73, Gault itself combined functional equiva-
lence and fundamental fairness analyses.
10. See generally Schultz & Cohen, supra note 6.
11. In Gault the Supreme Court described the juvenile court as "a peculiar system . . .
unknown to our laws in any comparable context." 387 U.S. at 17.
12. See F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 48-58 (1964); Hazard, The
Jurisprudence ofJuventle Deviance, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 3-19 (M. Rosenheim ed.
1976); Rubin, Retain the Juvenile Court? Legislative Developments, Reform Directions, and the Callfor
Abolition, 25 CRIME & DELINQ. 281 (1979); Susmann, Practitioner's Guide to Changes inJuvenile Law
and Procedure, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 311 (1978). These authorities refute the common misunder-
standing that the sole responsibility of the juvenile court is the ascertainment and protection of
the interests of the child. Although supporting this goal, juvenile courts frequently reinforce
community values. See also IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND
SANCTIONS, Standard 1:1 (1980) [hereinafter STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY]:
The purposes of a juvenile deliniency code should be:
a. to forbid conduct that unjustifiably and without excuse inflicts or risks sub-
stantial harm to individual or public interest;
b. to safeguard conduct that is without fault or culpability from condemnation
as delinquent;
c. to give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited and of the consequences of
violation;
d. to recognize the unique physical, psychological, and social features of young
persons in the definition and application of delinquency standards.
19831
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power principles.' 3 Because accomplishment of social goals is regulated by
legal principles, the juvenile court, notwithstanding its social welfare fabric,
is a legal institution subject to constitutional standards.
14
This curious mixture of social objectives and adult criminal law princi-
ples often produces incongruous results. For example, since adult proceed-
ings strictly enforce the due process requirement of fair notice, criminal laws
must provide adequate forewarning to the potential violator.15 In the event
of statutory ambiguity, prohibitory terms are generally construed in favor of
the defendant.1 6 Nevertheless, these criminal law principles were compro-
mised in In re A. 17 In this case a juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for
possessing a toy pistol during a probation-supervised group therapy ses-
sion."' Conceding that the conduct did not constitute a violation of any
adult criminal law, the appellate court nonetheless sustained the finding of
delinquency. The act was found to amount to "deportment endangering the
morals, health or general welfare of said child," a statutorily proscribed be-
havior giving jurisdiction to the juvenile court.1 9
In addition to jurisprudential differences between criminal law and de-
linquency adjudication, juvenile courts occasionally adopt incongruent juris-
dictional doctrines. In the case of In re Sanders, 20 the Nebraska Supreme
Court applied a de mrn'n'mis principle to narrow jurisdiction and exculpate a
minor charged with slapping another youth. The court's reasoning demon-
strates operation of the principle:
The charge that appellant was a delinquent child because of this
alleged occurrence or otherwise was not established. . . . There
was no previous misconduct of appellant claimed or shown. It was
established at the hearing that appellant had no record of im-
proper conduct and that his school experience was acceptable and
satisfactory both as to comportment and scholarship. A single vio-
lation of a law of the state by a minor does not always permit of a
conclusion that the transgressor is a juvenile delinquent.
21
13. See N. KITrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 108-68 (1971). The state, in the role of
parens patnhae, acts as guardian of citizens under a legal disability to act for themselves. West
Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).
14. Although the Supreme Court adheres to this characterization of the juvenile court, it
evaluates application of due process protections on a case-by-case basis. For instance, in McK-
eiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court rejected the right to a jury trial at a
delinquency adjudication, reasoning that right to jury trial was not essential to accurate
factfinding. The opinion noted that there are many other acceptable methods to ascertain facts.
Id at 543. For an excellent analysis of the constitutional methodology, see generally Rosenberg,
supra note 6.
15. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-29 (1957).
16. See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-r, CRIMINAL LAW § 10, at 72-74 (1972). See also STANDARDS
RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, Standard 1.1(C).
17. 130 N.J. Super. 138, 325 A.2d 837 (1974).
18. The youth had furnished another toy weapon to a friend who brandished his toy pistol
during the session. A., however, had not waved his toy weapon. Id at 138-39, 325 A.2d at 837-
38.
19. The petition in delinquency alleged the specific deportment of "possessing an offensive
weapon, to wit: a Univerk, Vulcanic .22 caliber toy pistol." Id
20. 168 Neb. 458, 96 N.W.2d 218 (1959).
21. Id at 464, 96 N.W.2d at 222. Presumably, this act of judicial nullification would be
currently unnecessary due to the emergence of diversionary programs. See Cressey & McDer-
mott, Diversion ftom the Juvenile Justice System, in JUVENILES IN JUSTICE 228-34 (H. Rubin ed.
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In general, the post-Gault trend has been to conform the procedures of
delinquency adjudication to the principles governing the adjudication of
criminal guilt. Illustrative is the 1978 Rhode Island Supreme Court decision
of In re John Doe.22 The court held that where the juvenile asserted self-
defense to the charge of murder, the burden of proof shifted to the prosecu-
tion to disprove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.23 By its ruling, the
court adopted the Supreme Court's decisions rejecting the criminal law rule
that the defendant must prove self-defense by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 24 It is noteworthy that the state court recognized this due process
right in a delinquency adjudication, thus implying the equivalency ofjuve-
nile and adult procedural rights.
Despite this general trend, juvenile and adult procedures are by no
means identical. As an example of the dissimilarity between juvenile justice
and criminal law objectives is In re Dewayne f. ,25 a juvenile case involving
non-compliance with a mandatory rule that dispositional (sentencing) hear-
ings be held within thirty days after adjudication. Excusing the infraction,
the Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned:
The State as the representative of the general public has an interest
in seeing that this juvenile is rehabilitated so that he becomes a
useful citizen and in no way a menace to society. In that circum-
stance it simply does not follow that the proper sanction for viola-
tion of the rule is dismissal of the proceeding.
2 6
A 1976 Texas decision also demonstrates adherence to distinct juvenile
law principles. 2 7 Texas criminal law required corroboration of accomplice
testimony to sustain a conviction. Characterizing the requirement as a mere
"statutory rule of evidence," the Texas Supreme Court found no constitu-
tional infringement in excluding juveniles from the scope of the protection.
A sharply worded dissent 28 argued that the corroboration rule applied aforti-
on' in delinquency proceedings in light of the heightened solicitude for
juveniles.
29
Thus, the juvenile court has retained some autonomy, separating it
from the mainstream of adult criminal law. Although Gault and its progeny
1980). See also Binder & Binder,Juvenile Diversion and the Constitution, 10 J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1982)
(legal issues relating to diversion).
22. 120 R.I. 732, 390 A.2d 920 (1978).
23. Id. at 742, 390 A.2d 926.
24. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975). For an excellent analysis of these cases and the underlying doctrines, see Jeffries &
Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminial Law Cases, 88 YALE L.J. 1325
(1979).
25. 290 Md. 401, 430 A.2d 76 (1981). The hearing was held on the 31st day and the cause
of the delay was not evident from the record.
26. Id at 407, 430 A.2d at 80.
27. In re S.J.C., 533 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
28. 533 S.W.2d at 749 (McGee, J., dissenting). The case was decided by a 4-3 vote.
29. If anything, it is more logical under the protective concept ofparenspatriae that the
legislature and courts should be more cautious with regard to the requirements the
concept [equivalency of due process protections for juveniles] demands; especially
prior to attaching to the juvenile the stigmas of being institutionalized and being de-
clared a delinquent.
Id at 750 (citation omitted).
1983]
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have incorporated large segments of adult criminal law into juvenile justice,
the transformation is incomplete. Juvenile justice continues to maintain an
independence which permits procedural flexibility.
III. RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW
A. Infan 9
Originating in the common law, the doctrine of infancy functioned to
excuse immature minors from criminal responsibility.30 Age presumptions
were established to govern the criminal law liability of this protected class.
"Children under the age of seven are conclusively presumed to be without
criminal capacity,"' 3' children seven to fourteen years are rebuttably pre-
sumed to lack criminal capacity, and children fourteen years or older are
treated as fully responsible. 32 The crux of the infancy doctrine is the princi-
ple that to be accountable, a youth must be able "to know what he is doing
and that it is wrong." 33  In addition, successful invocation of the infancy
defense requires proof that any cognitive impairments relate to the act at
issue.
34
The practical value of the infancy doctrine is significant. Successfully
invoked, it produces an acquittal and the defendant is excused from further
social control.3 5 Although American courts initially endorsed the concept of
infancy,3 6 the advent of the juvenile court has diminished its significance.
30. See generally Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 LAw. Q. REV. 364
(1937).
31. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 16, § 46, at 351.
32. Id Reference throughout this article to the notion of capacity relates to the ability of a
juvenile to perceive and understand legal concepts and to conform his behavior to the dictates
of law. Theoretically, a distinction exists between evidence of an individual's capacity and
evidence that he acted within that capacity on a certain occasion. In assessing responsibility of
an actor with regard to a designated offense, this distinction may be crucial. It is submitted,
however, that the significance is sometimes overstated. As Morse, Dimtnished Capacity." A Moral
and Legal Conundrum, 2"'NT'L J.L. AND PSYCHIATRY 271, 281 (1979), astutely observes, "[i]f a
defendant lacks the capacity to perform a mental operation, it may be conclusively presumed
that he or she did not perform that operation on any given occasion." (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted). Cf Lewin, Psychiatric Evidence in Crininal Cases for Purposes Other Than the
Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051, 1065 (1975) (impossible to determine by recon-
structive examination the exact state of mind of the defendant).
33. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 16, § 46, at 352. LaFave & Scott, offer this phrase
as "the most modern definition." Id. Alternative definitions include: knowledge of wrongdo-
ing, "a mischievous inclination, an intelligent design and malice in the execution of the act, a
consciousness of the wrongfulness of the act, and knowledge of good from evil." Id. (citations
omitted).
34. Carr v. State, 24 Tex. App. 562, 7 S.W. 328 (1888).
Proof that he knew the difference between good and evil, or that he was possessed
of the intelligence of ordinary boys of his age, does not fill the requirements of the law.
It must be shown that he had sufficient discretion to understand the nature and ille-
gality of the particular act constituting the crime.
Id at 562, 7 S.W. at 328.
35. Unlike an insanity acquittal, courts do not resort to automatic social control commit-
ment. For a discussion of the insanity procedure, see infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
Upon infancy acquittal in criminal court, the prosecution may refer the matter to juvenile
courts for further adjudication. The constitutional guarantee of freedom from double jeopardy,
however, may prohibit this action. For an analysis of the juvenile courts' response to the in-
fancy concept, see infra text accompanying notes 75-114.
36. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, § 46, at 351-53.
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Establishment of delinquency jurisdiction has removed the youthful offender
from the adult system except in aggravated circumstances. 37 Thus, the doc-
trine's only current criminal law relevance is to juveniles under the age of
fourteen charged as adults by virtue of waiver provisions. 38
Illustrative of the doctrine's restricted use is Adams v. State ,39 a case in-
volving a juvenile, just under fourteen, charged with felony murder.40 Ad-
ams had participated in the fatal robbery and had furnished the murder
weapon to a codefendant. The trial judge denied the defense of infancy
based on his assessment of the youth's courtroom demeanor 4 1 and the
youth's admissible confession; the appellate court approved the trial court's
careful evaluation of the issue.
42
B. Insamo
Although insanity is a controversial topic in criminal law,43 its ideologi-
cal foundations are firmly established. The law presumes that free will exists
and that man exercises choice in ordering his conduct. 44 Persons commit-
ting criminal acts, consciously choosing the "bad" path, are believed to de-
serve penal sanctions. Society has different social expectations, however, for
the impaired offender who is unable to cognitively and volitionally 4 5 partici-
37. For both serious offenses and chronic delinquents, criminal court authority may still be
obtained by means of juvenile court waiver of jurisdiction. Waiver may be effected by direct
filing of a complaint in criminal court or by an order of the juvenile court relinquishing its
jurisdiction. The latter procedure, requiring an adversarial "transfer hearing," is the more com-
mon practice. See generally IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS
(1980).
38. This practice is permitted in only four states: Arizona, Illinois, Arkansas, and Wash-
ington. In the other states the juvenile court's jurisdiction over children 14 and younger is
exclusive regardless of the offense charged. Id at 18.
39. 8 Md. App. 684, 262 A.2d 69 (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 928 (1970).
40. For a lucid explanation of the felony murder doctrine, see W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr,
supra note 16, § 71, at 545-61. Essentially, the doctrine imputes homicide liability to felonious
conduct resulting in an unintended death caused during commission of the underlying felony.
41. The youth had testified during pretrial motions and the trial judge was impressed by
Adams' demeanor, conduct, and appreciation of the proceedings. 8 Md. App. at 689, 262 A.2d
at 72.
42. But see People v. Roper, 259 N.Y. 170, 181 N.E. 88 (1932) (the mechanical application
of the infancy doctrine in juvenile felony murder). New York statutes authorized waiver to
adult criminal court only for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. Although mur-
der constituted such an offense, the underlying crime, robbery, did not satisfy the criterion.
Reasoning that robbery could only amount to a delinquent act, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the felonious intent required to instigate the felony murder doctrine was unproven. Circum-
stances attendant to the youth's conduct and deportment were excluded from examination. Id
at 173, 181 N.E. at 91.
43. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967). "The insanity defense is caught up in
some of the most controversial ideological currents of our time." Id. at 20; see also H. PACKER,
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 131 (1968) ("[t]here is no more hotly controverted
issue in the criminal law . . .
44. Pound, lntroduction in F. SAYRE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW xxxvi-vii (1927), quoted in
Monahan, Abolish the Insanty Defene?-Not Yet, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 725 n.28 (1973).
"Historically, our substantive criminal law is based on a theory of punishing the vicious will. It
postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and
choosing freely to do wrong." Id
45. Involition may excuse the defendant from criminal liability. In addition, the absence
of voluntariness may negate the actus reus of an offense. The classic example is automatism in
which the actor's bodily movements are unconsciously stimulated. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
19831
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pate in the deliberation process. The legally insane defendant is declared
not responsible for his conduct and excused from the consequences of the
criminal law.4 6 Since he is incapable of making "proper" choices, he is
blameless and undeserving of the moral condemnation of the criminal law.
4 7
Not every cognitive and volitional impairment, however, will exculpate
the offender. The insanity doctrine is narrowly circumscribed to include
only impairments arising from mental disorder, 48 and only the most severe
disorders activate the defense.49 In short, successful invocation of the in-
sanity defense requires proof of a mental disorder proximately causing nega-
tion of free will with respect to the conduct charged. Mere interference with
cognitive and volitional processes is insufficient.5 ° Furthermore, despite co-
gent arguments that the exercise of free will is equally frustrated by social
and cultural impairments, 5' the law withholds exculpation for disabilities
not associated with mental disorder.
52
Legal insanity is measured by various standards. The principal options
include the McNaughtan rule,5 3 irresistible impulse,54 the Durham or product
supra note 16, § 44, at 337-41; Bonnie & Slobogin, The Role of Mental Health Professionals in the
Criminal rocess." The Casefor Informed Speculation, 66 VA. L. REV. 427, 447 (1980). See also H.
FINGARET-rE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 44-65 (1979)
(insanity and involuntariness).
46. For a broad examination of the responsibility topic, see Lilly & Ball, A Critical Analysis
of the Changing Concept of Criminal Responsibility, 20 CRIMINOLOGY 169-84 (1982).
47. For a discussion of the function of fault in criminal law, see Strong, Fault Threat, and the
Predicates of Criminal Liability, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 441.
48. The dominant standard for defining mental disorder (commonly phrased as mental
disease or defect) was adopted by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia in McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The court reasoned that
"what psychiatrists may consider a 'mental disease or defect' for clinical purposes, where their
concern is treatment, may or may not be the same as mental disease or defect for the jury's
purpose in determining criminal responsibility." Id at 851. Thus the court fashioned its own
standard: "[Tihe jury should be told that a mental disease or defect includes any abnormal
condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and substan-
tially impairs behavior controls." Id at 851. Many authorities also subscribe to the Model
Penal Code caveat excluding "[any] abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise anti-social conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE § 401(2) (proposed Official Draft 1962).
But see STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, at 34, rejecting that
exclusion in the belief that psychiatrists concluding a defendant is mentally disordered will
invariably discover additional symptoms.
49. See Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 527, 640 (1978).
50. Although traditional insanity tests require absolute negation of the requiste capacities,
the Model Penal Code formula introduces the quality of continuousness into the assessment. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 401(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962): "A person is not responsible for
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law." (emphasis added).
51. See Morris, Psychiaty and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 520 (1968); cf
Diamond, Social and Cultural Factors as a Diminished Capacity Defense in Criminal Law, 6 BULL. AM.
A. PSYCHIATRY & L. 195 (1978). See also United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1010 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (rejecting medical model).
52. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
53. [Ilt must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not
to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). Historical investigation has determined that
the correct spelling is "McNaughtan." See R. MORAN, KNOWING RIGHT FROM WRONG xi-xiii
[Vol. 60:3
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rule,55 and ALI standards.56 The McNaughlan rule is limited to cognitive
incapacity, while the irresistible impulse test is restricted to volitional im-
pairment. Since both the McNaughtan and irresistible impulse tests constrain
the use of expert testimony, courts have searched for broader measures to
maximize the benefits of psychiatric opinion. 57 Currently in vogue is the
ALI test authorizing reliance on either cognitive or volitional incapacity.
Although adult criminal responsibility may be nullified by one of these
insanity tests, the defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is gener-
ally subjected to quasi-penal commitment.5 8 Because of the risk of repeated
conduct, the insanity acquittee is involuntarily committed for mental health
treatment, usually by special procedures applicable to this "dangerous" de-
fendant class. 59 In effect, the insanity acquittee is excused from the stigma of
criminal labeling but not from the social control of the criminal law.
6 °
C. Dtmnhshed Capacity
Seeking an alternative to the all-or-nothing insanity defense, courts and
legislatures have created partial exculpation doctrines grouped under the
heading diminished capacity. Terminology 6' may include partial responsi-
bility, limited responsibility, insane mens rea,6 2 and partial insanity. The
(1981). Moran's study refutes the alternative version proposed in Diamond, On the Spelling of
M'Naghten's Name, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 84 (1964).
54. "Broadly stated, this rule requires a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity if it is
found that the defendant had a mental disease which kept him from controlling his conduct."
W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, § 37, at 283.
55. "Under what is usually referred to as the Durham rule, adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect." Id. § 38, at 286.
56. See supra note 50.
57. In large part, the Durham or product rule was formulated to remove perceived obstacles
preventing effective use of psychiatric opinion. Mental health professionals contended that the
language of the traditional tests distorted psychiatric concepts. Less than two decades after
announcing the Durham decision, however, the District of Columbia court withdrew that stan-
dard in favor of the ALI test. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
(The product test had proved unsuccessful in improving the fit between psychiatric concepts
and legal responsibility). A plethora of legal publications have discussed the Brawner decision.
See, e.g., R. ARENS, INSANITY DEFENSE (1974); Symposium, United States v. Brawner, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 17-154.
58. See generally Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 605
(1981).
59. Although jurisdictions differ in regard to the methods of obtaining commitment of
insanity acquittees, only a minority use conventional civil commitment standards. Id at 605-06.
60. In fact, insanity acquittees are often confined for periods disproportionate to their acts.
Releasing authorities are loathe to risk return to the community of "dangerous" insanity acquit-
tees. See generally Burt, Of Mad Dogs and Sentists: The Peris of the "Criminal Insane, " 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 258 (1974); Kaplan, The Mad and the Bad- An Inquiry Into the DTsposition of the Criminally
Insane, 2 J. MED. & PHIL. 244 (1977). During the 1981-82 term the United States Supreme
Court agreed to review the constitutional contours of insanity commitments. See Jones v.
United States, 432 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 999 (1982).
61. Terms have been used imprecisely and interchangeably. See generally Arenella, The
Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 827 (1977); Dix, Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Liability:
Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility and the Like, 62 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SCIENCE 313 (1971); Lewin, supra note 32; Morse, supra note 32.
62. This term was coined by Morris, supra note 51, at 518-19. For criticism of the term as
"internally contradictory," see Monahan, supra note 44, at 728-29.
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aim is development of mitigating theories allowing formal reduction of the
grade of the defendant's offense to take into account his "diminished" crimi-
nal capacity.
Two general mitigatory theories may be identified. The first theory will
be referred to as technical mens rea and the second as partial or diminished
capacity. Technical mens rea relates to the mens rea or culpable mental
state that is an essential element of common law crimes. Under this theory,
in order to sustain a conviction, the prosecution is obliged to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the culpable mental state con-
tained in the definition of the crime. By virtue of this evidentiary dimin-
ished capacity, or technical mens rea doctrine,63 the defendant may
introduce psychological evidence bearing upon his incapacity to form the
requisite mental state of the offense.61 Although the principle has been uti-
lized primarily in murder prosecutions to negate premeditation and deliber-
ation,65 recent developments indicate this restriction may be discarded.
66
Moreover, courts may be receptive to expanding the scope of inquiry to in-
clude any evidence relevant to the formation of technical mens rea.67 Thus,
the mens rea variant represents a straightforward proof question as well as a
responsibility issue. 68
In addition to the evidentiary aspect of mens rea, the question of dispo-
sition is pivotal. The technical mens rea variant, extended logically, requires
63. The mens rea phrase is often used to express two different criminal law concepts. Kad-
ish, The Declte of Innomence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273 (1968), lucidly describes the dual uses
noting:
iThere are two principal categories of mens rea which should be distinguished.
The frst category we can call mens rea in its special sense. In this sense nens rea
refers only to the mental state which is required by the definition of the offence to
accompany the act which produces or threatens the harm ...
The second category of mens rea qualifications to liability is that of legal responsibil-
ity, which includes the familiar defences of legal insanity and infancy (emphasis in
original).
d. at 274-75.
For purposes of this article the term technical mens rea is used to describe the initial
construct.
64. See supra note 32.
65. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914 (1976). In some juris-
dictions, the doctrine is limited to negation of specific intent elements. Clearly, this decision
reflects policy rather than logic since mental disorder is capable of interfering with any mens rea
state. By restricting the doctrine to specific intent crimes characterized by lesser included gen-
eral intent offenses, the doctrine avoids complete exculpation of the defendant. In this manner,
it supplements the insanity defense as a mitigatory device. See Arenella, supra note 61, at 828-
29; Morse, supra note 32, at 275-77. For an explanation of general intent, see infta note 192.
66. See People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 264 (1978)
(authorizing use of diminished capacity to negate specific intent to commit theft in a burglary
prosecution); Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982) (permitting the use of expert
evidence to negate the mens rea for general intent crimes).
67. See Morse, supra note 32, at 276. Morse contends that diminished capacity is not a
special defense but a derivative of the general proposition that the prosecution must prove each
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
68. Unquestionably, Morse, supra note 32, at 275-76, Arenella, supra note 61, at 829, and
others are correct in asserting that the question is ultimately one of proof. However, the doc-
trine is clearly intended to perform a responsibility function by allowing offenders who fall
outside the insanity category to assert a diminished responsibility. For precisely this reason,
courts have been unwilling to recognize the concept as a general mens rea principle.
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exculpation. If the proffered evidence negates the existence of the mens rea
state and if no lesser included offense is proven, the defendant is entitled to
acquittal. Since legislatures and courts have been disturbed by this prospect,
they have illogically restricted the doctrine to specific intent crimes69 due to
fear that socially dangerous offenders will escape social control. By contrast,
the second mitigatory theory of partial or diminished responsibility is a more
limited concept. Developed in the context of homicide prosecution, the doc-
trine performs an ameliorative function for the sane but mentally disordered
defendant deemed to be "less culpable than his normal counterpart who
commits the same criminal act."' 70 The fact-finder is permitted only to re-
duce the grade of the offense to a homicide category with less drastic penal




Thus, the term diminished capacity encompasses several theories per-
taining to the adjudication of mentally disordered defendants. 73 The issues
are conceptually complex, affording no simple doctrinal solution. Further-
more, the paramount influence of social control, inextricably woven into re-
sponsibility principles, compounds the difficulty of the search for clarity.
Although commentators propose workable models, 74 judicial expressions of
diminished capacity remain in disarray.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY IN DELINQUENCY ADJUDICATION
The role of responsibility principles in juvenile justice has been prob-
lematic. Traditionally, the guiding philosophy of the juvenile court has been
rehabilitation.75 According to this view, the goal of juvenile justice is to se-
cure the proper treatment for delinquent youth. Since punishment is not
encompassed in this philosophy, no theoretical basis exists for doctrines
which excuse criminal responsibility.
The Gault decision has led to a re-analysis of juvenile justice. Observers
have argued that if the reality of delinquency adjudication involves punish-
ment, then incorporation of the criminal "defenses" of infancy, insanity, and
diminished responsibility may be appropriate. 76 With increasing frequency
69. See, e.g., State v. Doyon, 416 A.2d 130 (R.I. 1980); contra Hendershott v. People, 653
P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982).
70. Arenella, supra note 61, at 829 (footnote omitted).
71. Transplanted from the United Kingdom, the doctrine authorizes reduction of murder
to manslaughter. Id. at 830, notes that no American jurisdiction has formally adopted the
concept.
72. Dix, supra note 61, at 322, analyzes the doctrine's use of offense grades to accomplish
mitigation.
73. It has been strongly suggested that limitation of diminished capacity to mental disor-
der incapacities is illogical. Social, cultural, and other impairments may justify mitigation of
outcome. See generally Diamond, supra note 51.
74. See Arenella, supra note 61, at 849-65; Morse, supra note 32, at 290-96.
75. See generally Fox, supra note 2.
76. See generally Fox, Responsibihty in theJuvenile Court, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 659 (1970);
McCarthy, The Role ofthe Concept of Responsibility in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 181 (1976). For a pre-Gault analysis advocating development of responsibility
principles, see Westbrook, Mens Rea in theJuvenile Court, 5 J. FAM. L. 121 (1965).
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The establishment of a separate juvenile justice system recast the func-
tion of the infancy doctrine. At issue is the appropriate role of a doctrine
developed to prohibit cn'minal prosecution of immature youths within a sys-
tem that disavows criminal law aims. The logical conclusion is that theper se
exclusion of juveniles from criminal courts eliminates the rationale for an
infancy doctrine in juvenile justice.
77
In fact, most courts have adopted that position. An early Tennessee
case 78 sets forth the judicial exegesis. Seven-year-old Harry Humphrey
killed a playmate 79 and was adjudicated a delinquent child. On appeal,
counsel for Humphrey argued that the common law presumption of inca-
pacity had not been abolished by the recent (1911) juvenile court act. The
court disagreed. Rejecting the infancy doctrine, the Tennessee Supreme
Court declared, "[tihe child is not found guilty of delinquency as though
guilty of a crime."80 The opinion emphasized the non-punitive, social wel-
fare nature of delinquency adjudication.
8 '
After Gault there was a split of opinion regarding application of the
infancy defense. Proponents classify the infancy defense as a standard crimi-
nal law defense interposed to contest proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
They submit that since the Gault command of fundamental fairness has been
construed to require proof of the delinquency allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt,8 2 the principle necessarily includes disproof of recognized criminal
law defenses.
83
Opponents conceptualize the infancy defense as an ameliorative device
77. Different arguments, however, apply with respect to the role of infancy in transfer
hearings leading to criminal court jurisdiction. See P. Low, J. JEFFRIES, & R. BONNIE, CRIMI-
NAL LAW 646-51 (1982).
As a practical matter, waiver cases usually involve youths least eligible for infancy plead-
ing, such as those charged with serious crimes and exhibiting persistent anti-social histories. See
ACADEMY FOR CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, YOUTH IN ADULT COURTS: BETWEEN Two
WORLDS (1982); Hays & Solway, The Role of Psychological Evaluation in Certifratin ofjuveniles for
Trial as Adults, 9 HoUs. L. REV. 709, 710-11 (1972); Note, Certification of Minors to the Juvenile
Court.- An Empirical Study, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 404, 413-14 (1971).
78. Juvenile Court of Shelby County v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S.W.
771 (1918).
79. The exact circumstances of the homicide were undetermined. Reviewing the record,
the court stated that: "There appears to have been some controversy as to whether the killing
was accidental or designed. The judge . . .came to the conclusion from the evidence that a
crime had been committed . I..." 1d at 551-52, 201 S.W. at 772.
80. Id at 556, 201 S.W. at 773.
81. Juvenile Court of Shelby County v. State ex rel. Humphrey, 139 Tenn. 549, 201 S.W.
771 (1918). Employing identical reasoning, the federal courts uniformly have denied infancy
claims in regard to federal delinquency prosecutions. See Borders v. United States, 256 F.2d
458, 459 (5th Cir. 1958).
82. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
83. The constitutional dimensions of criminal law defenses are uncertain as a result of
recent Supreme Court rulings. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 24.
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aimed at prohibiting adult criminal prosecution of immature minors. They
adhere to the reasoning of pre-Gault juvenile authorities rejecting the doc-
trine. These opponents contend that although Gault is conceded to require
fundamental due process protections, the infancy doctrine, as a policy princi-




a. Availability of the Doctrine
Post-Gault decisions8 5 have produced conflicting outcomes reflecting the
doctrinal split. In Commonwealth v. Durham,8 6 a nine-year-old successfully ar-
gued that infancy is a principle independent of the criminal law and that its
rationale has been strengthened by the Gault guarantee of fundamental fair-
ness. Application of the infancy defense in juvenile court was also endorsed
by the California Supreme Court in the case In re Gadys R. 87 The signifi-
cance of the ruling is evident from the existence of an uninterrupted series of
appellate decisions construing its commands.8 8
Other courts have subscribed to the dominant, pre-Gault repudiation of
infancy as a delinquency principle. Illinois,8 9 Maryland, 9° Florida, 9 1 Ala-
bama,92 and Rhode Island 93 decisions support that proposition. The reason-
ing advanced by the Alabama Supreme Court is representative:
[W]hile Gault required procedural safeguards to be applied to juve-
nile proceedings, it did not attempt to define the jurisdiction of
84. Although favoring the application of the infancy defense from a doctrinal standpoint,
the IJA-ABA Standards nevertheless exclude infancy from its responsibility principles. The
Standards expressed concern that the delinquent excused by virtue of immaturity could be
subjected to civil commitment solely on the basis of undeveloped moral capacities. See STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, at 33. Considerable sentiment
existed in favor of incorporating the infancy concept into the standards but disagreement con-
cerning the appropriate dispositional outcome was insurmountable. Telephone interview with
John M. Junker, Reporter for the IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY AND SANCTIONS (Apr. 22, 1982) [hereinafter Interview with Standards Reporter].
However, the Standards did adjust the common law capacity presumptions, raising the mini-
mum age level for delinquency jurisdiction to 10 years. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANC-
TIONS STANDARDS supra note 12, Standard 2.1(A).
85. Unfortunately, many noteworthy juvenile court rulings concerning responsibility prin-
ciples are unreported. Only by means of empirical study have researchers been able to docu-
ment the practices. See, e.g., Donovan, TheJuventle Court and the Mentally DisorderedJuvenite, 45
N.D.L. REV. 222 (1969).
86. 255 Pa. Super. 539, 389 A.2d 108 (1978). See In re Andrew M., 91 Misc. 2d 813, 398
N.Y.S.2d 824 (1977).
87. 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970). Fox, supra note 76, at 668-72,
criticizes the California Supreme Court's analysis. Fox notes that notwithstanding the reference
to constitutional doctrine, the holding relies upon a statutory interpretation that he rates as
being "far from persuasive."
88. See infra text accompanying notes 95-113.
89. In re Carson, 10 I11. App. 3d 384, 295 N.E.2d 740 (1973). See also In re Dow, 75 Ill. App.
3d 1002, 393 N.E.2d 1346 (1979) (supporting Carson rationale).
90. In re Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 299 A.2d 856 (1973).
91. State v. D.H., 340 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1976). This consolidated opinion resolved a con-
flict among Florida intermediate appellate courts addressing the issue.
92. Jennings v. State, 384 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1980).
93. In re Michael, 423 A.2d 1180 (R.I. 1981).
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state juvenile courts, or to define the offenses which would bring
juveniles under that jurisdiction. . . . Our legislature . . . re-
moved capacity to understand the wrongfulness of one's conduct
from the elements which the state is required to prove in adjudicat-
ing a juvenile delinquent. This it may do without transgressing
constitutional barriers.
94
b. Scope of the Doctrine
The courts' application of the infancy doctrine involves inquiry into the
individual circumstance of each case. In jurisdictions recognizing the in-
fancy doctrine, courts are required to evaluate the juvenile's appreciation of
his conduct. Although age is an important factor in this determination,
some courts temper their evaluation with consideration of other factors, such
as intelligence, education, and background. California decisions demon-
strate this flexible approach. The following cases construing the Glads R.
infancy defense application, depicts the doctrine as flexible, expansive, and
dependent on individual circumstances.
In re Mihael John B. 95 involved a delinquency allegation of burglary of
an automobile. The facts revealed that the nine-year-old respondent had
assisted friends in entering the vehicle and removing a pack of cigarettes.
Overruling the trial court's finding of capacity, the appellate court cited the
minimal evidence, consisting of a colloquy between the youth and the arrest-
ing officer:
Murphy asked Michael if he knew right from wrong, if he knew it
was wrong to break into cars and steal. Michael said yes. Murphy
asked Michael how he would feel if someone took something that
meant a lot to him. Michael said he never had anything that
meant a lot to him, so it really didn't matter.
9 6
In re Tony C. 7 demonstrated the variation among California courts in
applying the doctrine. The intermediate appellate court reversed the trial
court's finding of capacity for a thirteen-year-old charged with rape
concluding:
Neither the custodial parent's testimony, which is likely to be self-
serving, nor the minor's statements describing his understanding,
are sufficient to establish this important element . . . [A] minor
may conduct himself. . . with a hopelessly confused state of mind,
particularly in the area of sexual activity, which has always been a
source of particular concern to the emerging adolescent. 98
94. Jennings v. State, 384 So. 2d 104, 106 (Ala 1980).
95. 44 Cal. App. 3d 443, 118 Cal. Rptr. 685 (1975).
96. Id at 445, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 686. See also In re Carl L., 82 Cal. App. 3d 423, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 125 (1978). Ten-year-old Carl threw matches into a neighbor's garage destroying the
building. The capacity evidence consisted of the father's testimony that "he had, on several
occasions, warned Carl that his fire-setting activities were wrong and should be stopped." Id at
425, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 126. Ruling that "substantial testimony" had been adduced to show
capacity, the intermediate appellate court distinguished its previous MichaelJohn B. opinion. Id.
97. 71 Cal. App. 3d 303, 139 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1977), vacated, 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957,
148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
98. 71 Cal. App. 3d 313, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 438 (citation omitted).
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Affirming the trial court, the California Supreme Court9 9 adopted a differ-
ent mode of analysis, concentrating upon the objective evidence of the cir-
cumstances of the offense:
Tony's constant use of the threat of deadly force demonstrates that
he knew his victim would not submit to sexual intercourse without
being exposed to great bodily harm. His conduct in taking her to a
secluded location behind a fence on a dead-end street shows he was
aware that he had to accomplish his intended deed in private in
order to minimize the risk of detection and punishment. And his
act of asking the victim if she intended to call the police, followed
by his flight from the scene, manifested both knowledge of the ille-
gality and consciousness of guilt.l°°
Tanya L.,' 0 ' a twelve-year-old, was adjudicated delinquent for conceal-
ing credit cards stolen by her older sister. Asserting incapacity, she denied
knowledge of the wrongfulness of her conduct. The defense was rejected
based on the appellate court's evaluation of the circumstances:
She saw her older sister charge goods that could not be paid
for. . . . When Tanya's father appeared, she said "Dad, I have
some cards here. What do I do with these?" The court could use
this question and infer that she knew she should not be possessing
those cards and that it was wrong to do so.
0 2
In the case In re HaroldM. ,103 a thirteen-year-old juvenile was convicted
of conspiracy to commit burglary. Evidence was introduced showing six
overt acts by Harold in furtherance of the conspiracy. In determining in-
fancy, the trial court relied upon evidence of two prior, sustained delin-
quency petitions alleging property crimes. Declaring the evidence both
proper and sufficient, the appellate court rejected the juvenile's two conten-
tions that there was insufficient evidence to prove conspiracy 0 4 and that a
thirteen-year-old could not comprehend that "simply the act of agreeing to
do something wrong is itself wrong."'
10 5
Recent decisions indicate judicial routinization of the capacity issue. In
re Cindy R. 106 considered the type of evidence necessary for prima facie satis-
faction of the infancy burden.10 7 The appellant advanced the interpretation
that "the court must receive and consider evidence of factors independent of
the acts charged in the petitions"' 08 and submitted that no evidence was
adduced "regarding her intelligence, education, experience, or moral frames
99. 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978). The court affirmed the trial
court in part, and reversed in part.
100. Id at 901, 582 P.2d at 964, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Seealso In re Gregory S., 85 Cal. App.
3d 206, 149 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1978) (minor manifested understanding of wrongfulness of his con-
duct by his flight from police and his conflicting versions of events).
101. In re Tanya L., 76 Cal. App. 3d 725, 143 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1977).
102. Id at 729-30, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
103. 78 Cal. App. 3d 380, 144 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1978).
104. Id at 387, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 748.
105. Id
106. 83 Cal. App. 3d 393, 147 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1978).
107. Under the Gladys R doctrine, the prosecutor was required to prove capacity by "clear
proof." In re Gladys R., I Cal. 3d at 867, 464 P.2d at 136, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 680.
108. 83 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
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of reference."' 0 9 Rejecting psychological testimony as an unnecessary re-
quirement, the court reasoned:
We see no reason to engraft this additional requirement ....
[Ilt would be an idle act, not to mention a wasteful one, to require
the court to take evidence on each and every one of the items ....
In some cases perhaps evidence regarding all of the factors is neces-
sary . . . in others the age of the child, observation of her in the
courtroom, and evidence of her conduct during the crimes charged
in the petition are .. adequate to establish that she knew her acts
were wrong. 1 
10
Finally, In re Clyde H"' demonstrates that in difficult cases, courts may
conduct a probing examination of capacity. Eleven-year-old Clyde threw a
brick at an infant neighbor, inflicting minor head trauma. The evidence
indicated that the child's brick throwing was chronic and he had been cau-
tioned repeatedly concerning the seriousness of the behavior. Despite expert
testimony supporting the stepfather's opinion that Clyde only partially un-
derstood the admonition and intelligence tests revealing an intelligence quo-
tient of sixty-seven with little ability to conceptualize or generalize," 12 the
appellate court reviewed the conflicting testimony and sustained the trial
court's judgment that the capacity burden had been satisfied." 
3
3. Analysis
The previously discussed discisions reflect an atheoretical approach to
evaluation of the infancy issue. The current emphasis of the California
courts, the only jurisdiction with considerable case law on the subject, is on
the juvenile's objective conduct. If the instant behavior or a pattern of past
behavior indicates the juvenile's understanding of the quality of the acts,
measured by common-sense standards, the courts are inclined to deny appli-
cation of the doctrine. By adopting this position, the California courts ad-
here to an individualized application of the infancy doctrine based on
objective behavior, while avoiding the practical consequences of receiving
detailed psychological and social evidence. Although psychological litera-
ture offers relevant guidelines for assessing youthful maturity levels," 14 Cali-
109. Id
110. Id Set also In re Patrick W., 84 Cal. App. 3d 520, 148 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1978). Consider-
ing the argument that the trial court could not use the circumstances of the offense as capacity
evidence, the appellate court reasoned, "[t]o prohibit evidence as to the child's conduct on the
occasion in question would often result in omission of the only truly relevant evidence on the
subject." Id at 527, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
111. 92 Cal. App. 3d 338, 154 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1979).
112. Interpreting the testing and interview data, the psychologist described Clyde's cogni-
tive style as conceptually blunted. She testified, " [alppellant will learn by example and apply
to that example, I think. He cannot generalize, so if he hits A with a rock, maybe, and I say
maybe, he will learn that he is not supposed to hit A with a rock, but he may hit B with a rock."
Id at 342, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 729.
113. After discussing the evidence thoroughly, the appellate court ruled, "[als sole judge of
the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, the trial judge was not required to
accept any inference from conflicting evidence that appellant did not understand these warn-
ings." Id at 344, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (citations omitted).
114. Beginning with Piaget's seminal study of moral development, psychological investiga-
tors have examined the cognitive and ethical capacities of children to execute decisions. J.
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fornia courts prefer behavioral evidence and limit evidence of psychological
and social capacities for purposes of the infancy "defense."
B. Insanity
1. Doctrinal Foundations
Proponents of extension of the insanity doctrine to juvenile justice rely
on straightforward syllogistic reasoning. Harrington and Keary are repre-
sentative.1 1 5 First, they argue that the right to plead insanity is included
within the constitutional ambit of due process because of its nearly universal
acceptance in adult jurisprudence.' 16 Citing Gault, they further submit that
juveniles are owed the same measure of fundamental fairness guaranteed
adult criminal defendants."t 7 Proponents add that the policy interests repre-
sented by the adult insanity defense apply equally to delinquency.
It is argued further that labeling delinquency a treatment rather than a
penal proceeding is not a sufficient basis on which to withhold elemental
safeguards." 8 The liberty deprivation experienced by the adjudicated juve-
nile is not redeemed by the change in labels."19 Proponents also belittle the
contention that the social welfare of the child is harmed by a finding of
insanity. They counter that alternative non-delinquency jurisdiction may be
used to secure treatment for the child,120 which may accomplish the same
social results.
To dispute these contentions, it may be argued that the traditional
PIAGET, MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (M. Gabain trans. 1965). See generall Kohlberg,
From Is to Ought. How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral
Development, in COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY 151-235 (T. Mischel ed. 1971).
Scharf, for example, claims that delinquents, compared to matched non-delinquents and to
adults, adhere to a different, less sophisticated understanding of legal events and social order.
Scharf, Law and the Child's Evolving Legal Conscience, in I ADVANCES IN LAW AND CHILD DEVEL-
OPMENT 1-30 (R. Sprague ed. 1982).
115. Harrington & Keary, The Insanity Defense in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 8 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 272 (1980). Accord, McCarthy, supra note 76, Popkin & Lippert, Is
There a Constitutional Right to the Insanity Defense in Juvenile Court?, 10 J. FAM. L. 421 (1971).
116. Two jurisdictions, however, have recently abolished the insanity defense, substituting
the concept of the technical mens rea defense based on mental disorder. See IDAHO CODE § 18-
207 (1982). MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-201 (1981). The recent insanity verdict in the case of
John W. Hinckley, Jr., has stimulated additional interest in abolition of the defense. Wash.
Post, June 24, 1982, at A6, cols. 1-3.
117. Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 660-73, characterizes this interpretation of Gault as the
"dual maximal" test incorporating values of fundamental fairness and functional equivalence to
adult safeguards. She adds that in recent juvenile decisions the Supreme Court has attached
less constitutional significance to functional equivalence. Id. at 673-94.
118. The Gault decision emphasized preventing treatment labels from masking the ultimate
consequences of juvenile justice system involvement. Appraising the nature of the conse-
quences, the Court noted, "[tihe fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a
'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which
the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time." 387 U.S. at 27.
119. Cf Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (involuntary mental health commitments of
juveniles). In Parham, the Court distinguished mental hospitalization from delinquency confine-
ment in terms of liberty deprivation Tj nsequences. See Garvey, Children and the Idea of Lzberty: A
Comment on the Civil Commitment Cases, 68 KY. L.J. 809 (1980).
120. Fox, supra note 76, at 680-82, rejects the insanity defense itself, but proposes adoption
of an analagous procedure designed to obtain appropriate care. Moreover, Fox would include




function of criminal responsibility principles, excusing those who are morally
blameless from penal consequences, is inapposite to delinquency adjudica-
tions which have no penal consequences. Furthermore, recognition of such a
defense for behaviorally disordered juveniles would frustrate treatment
goals. Advocates of this position propose that criminal responsibility be con-
sidered systematically at disposition. In contrast to the adult system, juve-
nile disposition ordinarily focuses on moral factors, selecting sanctions aimed
at refining personal moral codes. By deferring the criminal responsibility
inquiry to the dispositional stage, the system would take simultaneous ac-
count of responsibility and treatment principles.
Opponents of extending the insanity defense to juvenile proceedings
further argue that the major premise of the proponents' syllogism may be
subject to challenge. Although the insanity defense has been constitutional-
ized by state courts,1 2 1 the Supreme Court has not incorporated it within the
concept of due process.1 22  In fact, the Court has evinced a reluctance to
decide the question, 123 and existing precedents are unfavorable to the propo-
nents' position of constitutional status of the insanity defense.'
24
2. Decisions
a. Availability of the Doctrine
Several appellate courts have examined the competing arguments of the
applicability of the insanity defense in delinquency adjudication. Relying
on policy and constitutional principles, the decisions generally endorse the
insanity doctrine. In addition, survey data' 25 and unreported judicial prac-
tices 126 indicate further support for the concept.
In the Wisconsin case of In re WZhbum,1 27 antedating Gault, 12 8 uncontro-
verted expert testimony concluded that the conduct of the fifteen-year-old
charged with murder was the product of psychotic mental illness.' 29 The
121. See Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581 (Miss. 1931); State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P.
1020 (1910).
122. See Wales, An Analysts of the Proposal to Abolish the Insanity Defense in S I: Squeezing a
Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 702-04 (1976). See also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). In
dicta, the Powell Court noted, "[niothing could be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled
into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional terms." Id at 536.
123. See Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). The case concerned the constitutionality
of a Delaware statute requiring a criminal defendant asserting insanity to prove the contention
by a preponderance of the evidence. The Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial
federal question.
124. Although Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), established the rule for federal
courts that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court has re-
stricted the holding to the federal system. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952), the Court
upheld an Oregon statute requiring the defendant to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Court was urged to reconsider Leland in Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976).
125. See Donovan, supra note 85, at 234.
126. See Popkin & Lippert, supra note 115, at 431 n.40.
127. 32 Wis. 2d 152, 145 N.W.2d 178 (1966).
128. The Wisconsin court relied upon Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), which
affirmed the right to counsel at juvenile court waiver hearings. Although restricted in scope, the
Kent decision laid the doctrinal foundations for incorporation of adult due process protections.
Gault was decided during the next Supreme Court Term.
129. The psychiatrists disagreed, however, regarding satisfaction of the McNaughtan test. 32
Wis. 2d at 155, 145 N.W.2d at 179.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that "the juvenile law is not to be
administered as a criminal statute, and the rules of criminal procedure are
not to be engrafted upon the children's code."' 30  Nonetheless, the court
emphasized the punitive realities of delinquency sanctions. The possibility
of liberty deprivation was held to require fair treatment for the juvenile and
the opinion reasoned that due process included the insanity plea.
1 3 1
Is it fair to convict of crime when the defendant [sic] .. .is unable
to exercise the restraints upon his conduct that would enable him
to conform to acceptable standards. It would seem incongruous
that this great outpouring of concern should be lavished only upon
adults who may be criminals while the children whom we profess
to be particular objects of solicitude are bypassed.'
32
A New Jersey trial court opinion reached the opposite result in In re
H.C,133 another homicide prosecution. The court considered W/,Zbum but
found its reasoning both flawed and inapposite to New Jersey delinquency
proceedings. 134 Several arguments were combined in the court's analysis.
The opinion stressed that treatment and rehabilitation, not punishment,
were the consequences of delinquency adjudication.' 35 Moreover, without
entering an order of adjudication based on the instant conduct, the juvenile
court would lack jurisdiction to enforce orders of treatment. 136 The opinion
adopted a limited view of Gault, restricting its constitutional reach to proce-
dural and substantive "individual rights." The court found the insanity de-
fense to be a social policy rather than a due process safeguard for individual
rights. H. C was disapproved by a New Jersey appellate decision, In re
R.G W. 137 The court's analysis was uncomplicated. Noting that the New
Jersey legislature, subsequent to H. C, enacted a statute granting juveniles
"all defenses available to adults," 138 the opinion found this statutory author-
ity controlling.
The Louisiana Supreme Court considered, the juvenile insanity issue in
the 1978 case of In re Causey. 139 The Louisiana court examined the pre and
post-Gault United States Supreme Court delinquency decisions in Wi'nshzp
and McKeiver for constitutional guidance. 1 40 These cases were interpreted as
mandating access to safeguards amounting to a guarantee of fundamental
fairness. With regard to the insanity defense, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reasoned:
The only courts ever squarely confronted with the issue have held
130. Id at 156, 145 N.W.2d at 180.
131. Id at 163-64, 145 N.W.2d at 183-84.
132. Id at 164, 145 N.W.2d at 184.
133. 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322 (1969).
134. Id. at 596, 256 A.2d at 328.
135. Id at 597, 256 A.2d at 329.
136. The opinion did not consider alternative bases of jurisdiction. See tnfra note 145 and
accompanying text.
137. 135 N.J. Super. 125, 342 A.2d 869 (1975), afd, 70 N.J. 185, 358 A.2d 473 (1976) (per
curiam).
138. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-60 (West 1981).
139. 363 So. 2d 472 (La. 1978).




that, at least in adult proceedings, the denial of the right to plead
insanity, with no alternative means of exculpation or special treat-
ment for an insane person unable to understand the nature of his
act, violates the concept of fundamental fairness implicit in the due
process guaranties [sic].,
4 1
The Causey opinion held that "the right to plead insanity, absent some other
effective means of distznguishing mental illness from moral culpability, is also funda-
mental."1 42 Although alternatives were not presented, the court's reasoning
indicated a willingness to entertain options compatible with juvenile justice
principles.
A similar fundamental fairness rationale was used in a California inter-
mediate appellate court decision, In re M.GS 143 The opinion declared, "[a]
deprivation of the right to present such a defense [insanity] violates the con-
stitutional guarantee of due process of law .... "144 Ruling that a success-
ful insanity defense amounted to exculpation extinguishing jurisdiction, the
court considered alternative jurisdictional bases. Without deciding its appli-
cation in the instant case, the court noted that California's dependent child
jurisdiction includes juveniles found to be physically dangerous to the
public. 145
In addition to the New Jersey-. C opinion, only one reported appellate
decision, In re C WM ,146 has rejected application of the insanity defense in
delinquency adjudication. In an extensive analysis, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals acknowledged a conceptual distinction between technical
mens rea and responsibility doctrines. As for Gault and its progeny, the court
determined the McKeiver logic 14 7 apposite and reasoned, "[w]e find the cen-
tral question is whether the insanity defense serves some function essential to
fundamental fairness that cannot otherwise be performed adequately by
other procedures in the juvenile justice system."' 148 Unlike the Louisiana
Supreme Court, the District of Columbia court found alternative procedures
available to ensure fundamental fairness. The existing laws and regulations
were determined to provide adequate options for rehabilitation of the men-
tally disordered juvenile. ' 49 The court further ruled that the constitutional
mandate of fundamental fairness must be considered at disposition. To as-
sure fairness in result, the mentally disordered delinquent is guaranteed the
141. 363 So. 2d at 474 (citations omitted). But see supra notes 121-24 and accompanying
text.
142. 363 So. 2d at 476 (emphasis added).
143. 267 Cal. App. 2d 329, 72 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968).
144. Id at 336, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 811. The Nevada Supreme Court has also endorsed the
insanity defense in delinquency adjudications. In re Two Minor Children, 95 Nev. 225, 592
P.2d 166 (1979). Relying on Gault, the court concluded that "the concepts of due process and
fairness mandate permitting juveniles to plead and have tried the defense of insanity." Id at
230, 592 P.2d at 169 (citations omitted). The Montana Supreme Court is in accord. See In re
Stapelkemper, 172 Mont. 192, 562 P.2d 815 (1977).
145. 267 Cal. App. 2d at 337, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 812 n.3. See infra note 159.
146. 407 A.2d 617 (D.C. 1979).
147. See supra note 14.
148. 407 A.2d at 621.
149. To assure that the delinquent's mental capacity is in fact considered in relation to
disposition, the court mandated evaluation of "the mental health of the child at the time of the
offense as well as at the time of the hearing." Id at 623.
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same release and treatment benefits afforded the adult found not guilty by
reason of insanity.150
b. Scope of the Doctrine
Determining the substance of the insanity standard has been a principal
theme of criminal justice debate.15' By contrast, jurisdictions approving the
insanity plea in delinquency proceedings have devoted minimal attention to
the issue, implying that the insanity standard's criteria are to be found in the
penal law.
In the adult system, mental disorder, however denoted, 52 constitutes a
necessary predicate to the insanity defense.' 53 Despite the commendable
efforts of psychiatry to improve its classification system,' 54 the meaning of
mental disorder has proven to be an anathema in the insanity context.
155
The potential for confusion of terminology in juvenile justice is greater. For
example, developmental immaturity is occasionally confused with psychopa-
thology, and transient conditions are often assumed to represent fixed disor-
ders.' 56 Accurate classification of the emotional state of an adolescent is
especially challenging.157 Courts have not addressed this issue directly, and
150. Id at 625. See infra notes 165-67 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., the leading case of United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
See also supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. For a summary of the contours of the debate,
see H. FINGARETrE & H. HASSE, supra note 45, at 15-65.
152. The American Psychiatric Association has recorded an official preference for the term
"mental disorder." See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 5-6 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III]. See also
supra note 48.
153. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
154. DSM-IlI, supra note 152, represents the psychiatric profession's latest attempt to refine
diagnostic standards in relationship to evolving scientific knowledge. See Spitzer, Williams &
Sokol, DSM-IIT The Major Achievements and an Overview, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 151 (1980).
Criticism of earlier DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS editions.
has often been acerbic, challenging the validity of mental health diagnostic methods. See, e.g.,
Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl, On theJustifcationsfor Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75
(1968). The authors opine, "[b]ecause of the unavoidably ambiguous generalities in which the
American Psychiatric Association describes its diagnostic categories, the diagnostician has the
ability to shoehorn into the mentally diseased class almost any person he wishes, for whatever
reason, to put there." (footnote omitted). Id at 80. One persistent critic has discounted the
ability of DSM-III to correct such deficiencies. See J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 130-58 (3d ed. 1981).
155. H. FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 26-27 (1972), documents vari-
ous categories of psychiatric opinion:
(1) There is no such medical entity as mental disease, or we would do well not to use
the phrase.
(2) Mental disease is psychosis but not neurosis.
(3) Mental disease is any significant and substantial mental disturbance, or is any
condition at all that is authoritatively dealt with by the psychiatrist or physician treat-
ing mental conditions.
(4) Mental disease means substantial social maladaptation, or incompetence, or both
as judged by legal criteria.
(5) Mental disease is the failure to realize one's nature, capacities, or true self.
156. See Achenbach, Psychopathology of Childhood. Research Problems and Issues, 46 J. CONSULT-
ING & CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 759 (1978); Hornick, Healthy Responses, Developmental Disturbances,
and Stress or Reactive Disorders, II Adolescence, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY
1366 (A. Freedman & H. Kaplan ed. 1967).
157. Hornick, supra note 156, at 1366, observes:
Adjustment reactions of the adolescent are the rule rather than the exception. . . . It
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the few decisions considering "mental disorder" questions in juvenile in-
sanity adjudications have not established general principles for application
of the doctrine to children.'
58
c. Dispositional Outcomes
Decisions applying the infancy defense rarely discuss disposition; how-
ever, in insanity cases, courts are more apt to consider ultimate outcome for
the juvenile offender. Again, California is the forerunner in confronting this
issue. 159 Its statute governing use of the insanity defense in delinquency pro-
ceedings establishes a presumption in favor of mental health treatment. 160
Unlike the adult criminal justice system,161 social control is subordinated to
treatment. Outpatient treatment, in lieu of institutional confinement, may
be ordered for the juvenile at the discretion of the court. 162 Analyzing the
is vital to a valid interpretation of any adolescent behavior that it be seen in its devel-
opmental process against a background that includes the physiology and psychology
of adolescence, the family dynamics, and the wider scope of culture itself.
See also Nicholi, The Adolescent, in THE HARVARD GUIDE TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY 519-40 (A.
Nicholi ed. 1978).
158. In one case the California Supreme Court addressed use of mental retardation as a
means of demonstrating legal insanity and adopted the adult standard. See In re Ramon M., 22
Cal. 3d 419, 584 P.2d 524, 149 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1978). Earlier that year the California Supreme
Court had adopted the ALI test for adult insanity proceedings. See People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d
333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1978). In Ramon M., the court concluded, "[t]he ALI
test with its reference to 'mental defect' was carefully drafted to encompass any defense based
upon the idiocy or mental retardation of the defendant [sic]." 22 Cal. 3d at 422, 584 P.2d at
526, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 389. The court also adopted for juveniles the adult standard for defining
"mental disease or defect." Id. at 427, 584 P.2d at 530, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 393. Elaborated on in
McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the standard requires proof of
"[any] abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional
processes and substantially impairs behavior controls." Note, however, that this standard re-
quires both cognitive and volitional impairment. This duality conflicts with the ALI test itself
requiring either cognitive incapacity ("either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct") or
volitional incapacity ("or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law"). See supra note
50. Presumably, drafting of the McDonald standard in the conjunctive represents judicial
oversight.
159. See Gladys R., I Cal. 3d at 864-66, 464 P.2d at 134-36, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 678-80. The
California Supreme Court recommended that trial courts substitute alternative juvenile court
jurisdictional bases suitable to accomplishment of treatment objectives. Although the court
contemplated resort to both status offense and dependency jurisdictional bases, a preference was
expressed for the status offense category. Contemporary juvenile justice jurisprudence rejects
the status offense model, however, and favors dependency actions for regulating non-criminal
circumstances. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO NON-CRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR (Tenta-
tive Draft 1977).
Fox, supra note 76, in his proposal for a partial responsibility doctrine for grossly immature
and mentally ill juveniles, recommends "care and protection" and involuntary civil commit-
ment actions. Although preferring the minimalist "care and protection" intervention, Fox
would allow the more stringent sanctions for juveniles displaying "aggressive and dangerous
defiance of other people's rights." Id at 681-82.
160. [I]f the court finds that the minor was insane at the time the offense was commit-
ted, the court, unless it shall appear to the court that the minor has fully recovered his
sanity, shall direct that the minor be confined in the state hospital for the care and
treatment of the mentally disordered ...or the court may order the minor to un-
dergo outpatient treatment ...
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 702.3(b) (West Supp. 1981).
161. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
162. For a general description of delinquency civil commitment practices, see Donovan,
supra note 85, at 246-48; Rubin, The' Emotionally Disturbed Juvenile Offender-An Interim Re-
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statute in People v. Superior Court,' 63 the California court sustained the legisla-
tive purpose of providing dispositional authority to the juvenile court subse-
quent to insanity exculpation.
164
In the case of In re C WM ,165 the District of Columbia court considered
the issue of disposition. The court reviewed the general dispositional re-
quirements for mentally disordered delinquents and found the provisions
satisfactory. Essentially, the applicable provision authorized involuntary in-
patient civil commitment, reviewable at six month intervals. ' 66 To assure
use of the procedure, the decision held that "the Uuvenilel Division must con-
sider, at the dispositional hearing the mental health of the child at the time
of the offense, as well as at the time of the hearing."' 167 Although denying
the insanity defense, the District of Columbia's decision attempted to create
an equivalent to an insanity commitment.
Other decisions applying the insanity defense in delinquency adjudica-
tion have not addressed the dispositional issue. 168 Presumably, those courts
have concluded that the juvenile court is empowered with sufficient jurisdic-
tional authority to accomplish equitable results for the juvenile insanity ac-




In general, the decisions are characterized by an unsatisfactory analysis
of the insanity question. Citing Gault most courts grant juveniles the right to
plead insanity. In nearly every instance, the analysis is summary and devoid
of the reasoned thinking ordinarily exercised in major constitutional and
policy decisions. The courts do not address in depth the doctrinal functions
of the insanity defense in relation to the special characteristics of juvenile
justice. 170 Additionally, the courts fail to address the application of the in-
port, 17-19 (Report Prepared for Dep't of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention and Nat'l Ass'n of Juvenile Justice Administrators Jan. 1981).
163. 95 Cal. App. 3d 380, 157 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1979).
164. Whether the petition be viewed as sustained and in effect suspended when the
minor is found not guilty by reason of insanity, or declared "not true" by reason of
such finding, we hold that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity on a 602 peti-
tion [delinquent act] does not per se deprive the juvenile court of the power to make
an otherwise valid commitment order under section 702.3, and that such petition car-
ries with it continuing jurisdiction justifying disposition under the latter section.
Id. at 391, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
165. 407 A.2d 617 (D.C. 1979).
166. Id at 623 n.13.
167. Id at 623 (emphasis in original). Harrington & Keary, supra note 115, at 277-78, misin-
terpret this element of the holding. They criticize the opinion by arguing that the dispositional
mode of insanity consideration ignores both juveniles no longer mentally ill and juveniles sane
at the time of the rffense but currently mentally ill. The quoted portion of the opinion contra-
dicts that interpretation, however, requiring mandatory consideration of the mental state at
both intervals.
168. But see supra note 136 and accompanying text.
169. To obtain treatment results, courts may invoke dependency and neglect and civil com-
mitment procedures. See Donovan, supra note 85, at 234-35; Popkin & Lippert, supra note 115,
at 431 n.40.
170. Advocating incorporation of adult responsibility principles into delinquency adjudica-
tion, McCarthy, supra note 76 at 207-19, offers an equally unsatisfactory analysis. Although he
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sanity defense. The decisions are largely silent with respect to the insanity
standard and dispositional procedures.
D. Dmi'nshed Capacty
1. Doctrinal Foundations
Scant attention has been paid to the function of the diminished capac-
ity doctrine in juvenile delinquency. With respect to the partial responsibil-
ity theory of diminished capacity, culpability determinations are intrinsic to
juvenile dispositional decisionmaking. The identical mitigating factors used
by this theory to distinguish between grades of offenses are routinely incor-
porated into delinquency outcome determinations.1
7 1
Diminished capacity in the technical mens rea sense requires a different
analysis. The technical mens rea defense is properly analyzed as a proof
rather than as a responsibility question. 172  Statutory offenses, whether
crimes or delinquent acts, ordinarily require proof of a defined culpable
mental state.173 Because Winship demands proof of all delinquency offense
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, mens rea has acquired constitutional
dimension.174 This principle does not require extended case analysis unless
courts confuse the technical mens rea and responsibility doctrines.'
75
In delinquency adjudication, technical mens rea has received minimal
scrutiny. When considered, the issue is usually analyzed within the familiar
Gault framework. Juvenile courts are reluctant to separate the technical
mens rea from the wider scope of criminal responsibility.176 Occasionally,
devotes considerable attention to the function of responsibility principles, McCarthy's examina-
tion of constitutional doctrine is superficial. Furthermore, McCarthy's investigation of his pro-
posal's impact is incomplete.
171. See generally L. Cohen, Juvenile Dispositions: Social and Legal Factors Related to the
Processing of Denver Delinquency Cases (Utilization of Criminal Justice Statistics Project, Ana-
lytic Report 4 1975); Scarpitti & Stephenson, Juvenle Court Dz'positions-Factors in the Decision-
Making Process, 17 CRIME. & DELINQ. 142 (1971).
172. See infa notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
173. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 16, § 27, at 191-95; id. § 31, at 218-23.
174. See generally Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 24. STANDARDS RELATNG TO JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, have implicitly proposed this rule for juveniles. Although the
IJA-ABA Standards do not expressly adopt the principle, its drafters assumed that constitu-
tional doctrine required the result. Interview with Standards Reporter, supra note 84. More-
over, the Standards propose that a mens rea state be required to substantiate even minimal
culpability and that liability without fault be abolished. See STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVE-
NILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, Standard 3. 1.
175. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1946). In Fisher, the Supreme Court
rejected an appeal to fashion a diminished capacity doctrine for the District of Columbia. The
petitioner contended that mental deficiency, short of legal insanity, was relevant to disproving
the premeditation-deliberation element of first-degree murder. The Court interpreted the argu-
ment in terms of the responsibility doctrine, which it categorized as a matter of local concern.
For an analysis of Fiher's contemporary viability, see Comment, Men Rea and Insanity, 28 ME.
L. REV. 500, 525-29 (1976).
176. See In re Betty Jean Williams, No. 27-220-J (Juv. Ct., D.C. Oct. 20, 1959) (quoted in
Westbrook, supra note 76, at 121-22). Judge Ketcham declared:
Counsel's motion also states that an assessment of respondent's mental state as of the
time of the alleged delinquency is required. This appears to involve a serious miscon-
ception of the philosophy and spirit of the Juvenile Court Act. . . . Free will, evil
intent, moral responsibility and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are the lan-
guage of the criminal code.
Id at 121.
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however, decisions focus on the mens rea states and utilize the Winship rule.
2. Decisions
Notwithstanding the conceptual distinction between technical mens rea
and responsibility questions, courts persist in consolidating the doctrines,
sometimes understandably. A classic example involves a criminally negli-
gent act committed by a juvenile. In State v. Peterson,' 77 a fifteen-year-old
was convicted in criminal court of manslaughter arising from a reckless driv-
ing episode.1 78 On appeal, Peterson claimed that the trial court had erred in
refusing his tendered instruction asserting age as a factor in determining the
criminal negligence mens rea. *79 Emphasizing the objective standard of
criminal negligence, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
reasoning that "[w]here intent is an ingredient .. .the age and mentality of
the accused should be taken into account. This may be also true where judg-
ment and understanding affects the criminality . . . . Intent or knowledge
is not an ingredient of [the statute charged]." 180
People v. Nichols,181 involving a thirteen-year-old prosecuted in criminal
court, posed a more orthodox subjective mens rea issue. The emotionally
unstable adolescent had abducted a five-year-old for sexual purposes and
impulsively murdered the child. Accepting a plea of guilty, the trial court
entered a judgment of first-degree murder. The appellate court disagreed,
finding insufficient evidence of premeditation-deliberation. The opinion
cited Nichols' panic and shame arising from the belief that the victim would
inform adults of the illicit sexual conduct and characterized the behavior as
"desperate and frantic."i
82
177. 153 Minn. 310, 190 N.W. 345 (1922).
178. The reckless character of the minor's driving was undisputed. The principal fault was
excessive speed for the prevailing conditions. Id. at 312, 190 N.W. at 346.
179. The indictment charged "manslaughter, through culpable negligence in the operation
of an automobile" and the prosecution submitted as its case-in-chief evidence of the defendant's
excess rate of speed. Id, 190 N.W. at 346.
180. Id, 190 N.W. at 346. STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note
12 adopts the defendant's position. Standard 3.2 states:
Where an applicable criminal statute or ordinance penalizes risk-creating conduct, it
should be a defense to juvenile delinquency liability that the juvenile's conduct con-
formed to the standard of care that a reasonable person of the juvenile's age, maturity,
and mental capacity would observe in the juvenile's situation.
181. 88 Cal. App. 2d 221, 198 P.2d 538 (1948).
182. Eschewing reliance upon the objective criterion of "length of time available for deliber-
ation," the court examined the totality of the minor's cognitive and emotional circumstances to
assess the premeditation-deliberation formula. The opinion noted, " [tjhis crime was committed
by a 13-year old girl, with a mental age of 11, who was mentally and emotionally defective, who
had a natural tendency toward cruelty to animals, and who was then going through a period of
extreme mental and emotional stress." Id at 228, 198 P.2d at 542. These data were interpreted
as explanatory of an impulsive, immature reaction, inconsistent with the objective standards of
premeditation-deliberation.
See also People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964) involving a
similar determination. Fifteen-year-old Dennis Wolff, a seriously disturbed juvenile obsessed
with sexual ideation, murdered his mother. He believed it was necessary to kill his mother in
order to use the family home for sexual activities. Significant planning preceded the homicide.
Reversing the jury verdict of first-degree murder, the California Supreme Court ruled "[t]he
true test must include consideration of the somewhat limited extent to which this defendant
could maturely and meaningfully reflect upon the gravity of his contemplated act." Id at 821, 394
P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287. (emphasis in original).
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The following cases illustrate various judicial determinations of techni-
cal mens rea. The eleven-year-old in the case of In re TR.S 183 was adjudi-
cated delinquent on the basis of a finding of criminally negligent homicide.
While playing with a neighbor, T.R.S. discharged a loaded weapon from a
distance of four feet. The appellate court combined subjective and objective
factors in assessing the reasonableness of the conduct. With respect to the
child's frame of mind, the court cited his propensity for playing with fire-
arms despite adult warnings. For the objective test, the opinion employed
the standard of "a boy of his age, mental capacity, experience, and
intelligence .... ,,184
A recent New York trial court opinion 185 considered the mens rea of a
nine-year-old charged with bank robbery. Acknowledging that the offense
required proof of a specific intent, the court ruled that the appropriate evi-
dence had been adduced. 86 To evaluate the mental state, the court utilized
a broad concept of mens rea incorporating the factor of maturity.
18 7
Finally, a Rhode Island decision, In re Michae,' 88 emphasizes another
variant of the doctrine. The twelve-year-old asserted the absence of mens
rea as a defense to rape.189 Characterizing the issue as "the mental state that
is required by the definition of the offense to accompany the act that pro-
duces or threatens the harm,"' 9° the court evaluated the evidence and de-
clared that the mens rea had been proven.' 9 ' Furthermore, the court
refused to consider a diminished capacity claim based on immaturity, noting
that the Rhode Island construction of the doctrine did not apply to general
intent offenses, 192 such as the instant violation.'
9 3
183. 1 Cal. App. 3d 178, 81 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1969).
184. Id at 181, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 575 (citations omitted).
185. In re Robert M., 110 Misc. 2d 113, 441 N.Y.S.2d 860 (1981).
186. Id at 117, 441 N.Y.S.2d 863.
187. "Moreover, if the Respondent offers evidence that any combination of factors, includ-
ing immaturity, negatives the requisite specific intent, he will be exonerated . Id at 116,
441 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (footnote omitted).
188. 423 A.2d 1180 (R.I. 1981).
189. In addition, Michael asserted the infancy doctrine. See supra note 93 and accompany-
ing text.
190. 423 A.2d at 1183.
191. The court stressed the calculated manner by which the respondent lured the five-year-
old victim into a park in order to commit the offense. He had asked her to assist him to "catch
birds' eggs." Id
192. The phrase "general intent" is troublesome because of its multiple meanings in the
criminal law. See W. LA FAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 16, § 28, at 201:
Sometimes "general intent" is used in the same way as "criminal intent" to mean the
general notion of mes rea . . . . Or, "general intent" may be used to encompass all
forms of the mental state requirement . . . . Another possibility is that "general in-
tent" will be used to characterize an intent to do something on an undetermined
occasion.
Arenella, supra note 61, at 828 n.7, provides a simplified definition: " 'General intent' crimes
require only that the individual voluntarily commit the forbidden act."
In Mzchael, the Rhode Island Supreme Court described a general-intent offense as one
which "requires proof that the defendant intended to do the proscribed act, that it was done
unlawfully, and that it was not done inadvertently." 423 A.2d at 1183.
193. For persuasive criticism of the limitation to specific intent crimes, see Arenella, supra





When courts are able to separate the culpability question from the more
general framework of responsibility, the decisions indicate a relatively so-
phisticated examination of mens rea states. Analyzing the capacity of the
juvenile to form the requisite mens rea, the courts take into consideration
relevant subjective and objective factors. The child's maturity and judg-
ment receive particular attention and the courts are sensitive to emotional
and psychological evidence.
Particularly noteworthy is the willingness of courts to adapt the objec-
tive criminal mens rea standards to the individual circumstances of the juve-
nile. Although reported cases are infrequent, a number of opinions reflect a
sensitivity to the age issue, thus demonstrating the capacity of juvenile jus-
tice to creatively apply criminal law principles to achieve just results. The
relative paucity of reported decisions, however, qualifies these observations.
Diminished capacity represents a novel concept in delinquency adjudi-
cation. Only occasionally have courts reviewed the application of the tech-
nical mens rea doctrine to juveniles. *Moreover, partial responsibility has
been ignored. Nevertheless, the contemporary trend toward determinancy
in delinquency dispositions, replicating adult sentencing standards, may
stimulate interest in the doctrine.
V. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED THEORY
A. Preh'mtnar Observations
The writings of authorities in the juvenile justice field demonstrate that
questions ofjuvenile responsibility are not remote. Courts struggle to assimi-
late the adult principles of infancy, insanity, and diminished capacity into
the juvenile justice system. The task is complicated by the penal assump-
tions underlying the principles; each of the doctrines was established to fulfill
an exculpatory or mitigatory function relating to punishment. Occasionally
the doctrinal fit is neat, but more often the criminal law responsibility justifi-
cations are incompatible with juvenile court practices. Since major differ-
ences exist among penal aims and patterns of disposition, evidence supports
establishment of specialized juvenile justice responsibility principles.
194
An appropriate starting point to develop an integrated theory of delin-
quency responsibility is to identify the purposes of delinquency intervention.
194. Identical reasoning was employed by the IJA-ABA Standards project in its formulation
of delinquency sanctioning principles. Although disavowing traditional juvenile court dogma
and adopting criminal law proportionality values, the Standards insisted upon a sense of separa-
tion between juvenile justice and criminal justice jurisprudence. The sentiment is captured in a
footnote appearing in IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DisPosITIONS (Approved Draft
1980) at 19 n.5. (quoting Cohen, Position Paper (IuvenilJusttce Standards Project, No. 18, 1974)):
Juveniles may be viewed as incomplete adults, lacking in full moral and experimental
development, extended unique jural status in other contexts, and deserving of the so-
cial moratorium extended by this and all other societies of which I am aware. Thus,
removal of the treatment rationale does not destroy the rationale for a separate system




The IJA-ABA Standards provide a valuable frame of reference. The Disposi-
tions Standards decree:
The purpose of the juvenile correctional system is to reduce juve-
nile crime by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law pro-
scribing certain behavior and by developing individual
responsibility for lawful behavior. This purpose should be pursued
through means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique
characteristics and needs of juveniles, and that give juveniles access
to opportunities for personal and social growth.'
9 5
This statement of purpose proposes two fundamental principles: that the
characteristics of a juvenile demand individualized consideration and that
disposition is intended to maximize developmental capacities. According to
this scheme, personal culpability becomes an organizing principle of delin-
quency, determining the nature of the remedial consequences for the delin-
quent child.196 Although acknowledging the punitive effects of delinquency
sanctions, the IJA-ABA Standards do not abandon the forward-looking pur-
pose of juvenile justice intervention. 1
97
In addition to different emphases in penal values, juvenile and adult
courts implement responsibility principles dissimilarly. In the adult system,
culpability decisions are centralized in adjudication. 198 The responsibility
decision made at adjudication is subject to only partial amelioration at the
subsequent sentencing hearing. In effect, if the mentally disordered and im-
mature offender is convicted in criminal court, he is likely to be punished by
the imposition of unambiguously punitive consequences. 199
In the juvenile justice system, on the other hand, culpability principles
195. IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING To DISPOSITIONS, supra note 194, Standard 1.1.
196. Ina significant departure from juvenile justice tradition, the IJA-ABA Standards urge
a proportionality standard. Sanctioning limits are fixed in relationship to culpability. See
STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, at 34-45. Compare the
traditional view espoused, supra note 5.
197. IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSITIONS, supra note 194, Standard 2.1,
states: "in choosing among statutorily permissible dispositions, the court should employ the
least restrictive category and duration of disposition that is appropriate to the seriousness of the
offense, as modified by the degree of culpability ......
198. In traditional penal models, adjudication is the fulcrum of responsibility determina-
tion. Infancy, insanity, and diminished capacity decisionmaking occur at this stage. The insur-
gence of determinate sentencing may accelerate this operation, since sentencing decisions focus
upon non-individualistic culpability factors. See Monahan & Ruggiero, Psychologtcal and Psychiat-
rc Aspects of Determinate Criminal Sentencing, 3 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 143 (1980). But see
Weissman, Determinate Sentencing and Psychiatric Evidence.- Due Process Examination, 27 ST. LOUIS
U.L.J. 347 (1983).
199. But see the "guilty but mentally ill" concept authorizing a treatment disposition for
sane but mentally ill adult offenders. This provision provides that the duration of treatment
confinement cannot exceed the maximum penal term prescribed for the offense of conviction.
See generally, Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill.- A Retreat from the Insanity Defense, 7 AM. J.L. & MED.
237 (1981); Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill." A Reasonable Compromisefor Pennsylvania, 85 DICK.
L. REV. 289 (1981); Comment, Insanity-Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate
Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 351 (1979); Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill."
An Historical and Constitutional Analysi , 53 U. DET. J. URB. L. 471 (1976); Comment, The Constitu-
tionality ofMichigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 188 (1978). For com-
ments on effect of "guilty but mentally ill" verdict, see Guilty But Insane Just Means Guilty,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1983, at 78.
See also B. WOOTrON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW chs. 2 & 3 (1963) (Lady Wootton's
proposal that mens rea be abolished in favor of a behavioral remedial approach). Wootton's
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are usually applied at the dispositional phase. The basic task of delinquency
disposition is to fashion the remedy most suited to improving the juvenile's
ability to function in the community. Although questions of community
safety, retribution, and general deterrence are involved in the decisionmak-
ing, these values are subordinated to the function of constructing an appro-
priate remedial "program. ' '200 Since the court systematically incorporates
assessment of personal culpability into its remedial evaluation, the juvenile
justice system is able to implement responsibility principles more efficiently
and delinquents are routinely accorded the benefits of responsibility theory.
Thus, the characteristics of the juvenile justice system encourage a fresh
examination of responsibility principles. Adult concepts and practices need
not be accepted blindly. If the objective is to establish doctrines that satisfy
constitutional mandates of fundamental fairness, promote the dictates of ju-
venile justice, and recognize the unique psychological and developmental




a. Technical Mens Rea
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the juvenile is enti-
tled to have each element of the offense, including the specified mens rea,
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Winship" requires nothing less. Whether
the incapacity is biological or psychological in origin, evidence of the inabil-
ity to form the mens rea is a proper means of disputing guilt.2 01 Exulpatory
evidence probative of a mens rea state is only one category of defense evi-
dence and no valid theory can be proposed to restrict its introduction.
20 2
If as Morse contends, "most mens reas are rather simple states that re-
quire little intelligence or cognitive capacity," 20 3 then the relationship be-
tween intelligence and formation of mens rea is of minor practical
significance.2 0 4 The previously cited cases20 5 belie that characterization
scheme has been discredited as too radical a departure from criminal law principles. See Kad-
ish, supra note 63, at 285-90; Monahan, supra note 44, at 733-38.
Norval Morris has recently proposed a thoughtful paradigm for incorporating mental con-
dition into sentencing. See N. MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 128-76 (1983).
200. Notwithstanding the infusion of proportionality and determinancy principles into its
jurisprudence, the Standards do not abrogate the forward-looking purposes of disposition; a
humanistic commitment to youth is maintained. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
201. Adopting this position, Morris, supra note 51, at 519, declares, "[elvidence of mental
illness would be admissible as to the mens tea issue to the same limited extent that deafness,
blindness, a heart condition, stomach cramps, illiteracy, stupidity, lack of education, 'foreign-
ness,' drunkenness, and drug addiction are admissible." (footnote omitted).
202. The Model Penal Code subscribes to this position declaring: "Evidence that the de-
fendant suffered from mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that
the defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense." MODEL
PENAL CODE, § 4.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
203. Morse, supra note 32, at 277.
204. Considerable disagreement exists among commentators examining the nexus between
psychological testimony and proof of mens rea states. Arenelia, supra note 61, states, "the only
type of mental abnormality that could establish such incapacity would be a severe mental disa-
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with respect to juveniles. Furthermore, examination of psychological investi-
gations20 6 indicates that some children may be unable to comprehend sim-
ple commands of the law and that, at a minimum, juveniles possess unequal
cognitive and reasoning skills. Immaturity and, to a lesser degree, mental
illness are valid factors in determining a juvenile's capacity to form mens rea
states.
207
Several significant issues require additional comment. The IJA-ABA
Standards Relating to Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions ban delinquency liability
without fault. 20 8 The Standards emphatically reject the notion that delin-
quency liability can be imposed without demonstration of culpability. Strict
liability is construed to be offensive to values favoring individualized assess-
ment of the juvenile's circumstances. 20 9 Although this decision is a policy
rather than a constitutional judgment, its logical foundation is solid and the
principle merits endorsement.
The remaining issue concerns the disposition of a juvenile acquitted as a
result of a psychological mens rea defense. In terms of strict criminal law
theory, the juvenile is entitled to unconditional exculpation and jurisdiction
is extinguished. If the juvenile court wishes to reinstitute jurisdiction to ac-
complish social welfare purposes, use of a non-delinquency jurisdictional au-
thority, such as dependency, is permissible. 210  Use of an automatic
commitment procedure, similar to an adult insanity commitment, however,
violates the theory of a mens rea defense.
2 1"
bility that substantially interfered with the defendant's reality-testing functions." Id at 834-35
(footnote omitted).
Dix, supra note 61, at 324-27, is more sanguine. While skeptical concerning the ability of
psychological testimony to aid in the determination of mens rea, he admits that, "Is]ome states
of mind do lend themselves to the type of analysis that mental health personnel feel is appropri-
ate." Id at 325.
Lewin, supra note 32, at 1064-65, is considerably more optimistic. He reasons,
[i]ndeed it would seem that if psychiatry offers anything of value in this area, it is in
describing the functional processes of the mind and, if trained in psychodynamic prin-
ciples, in identifying the unconscious factors that motivated the defendant and pre-
vented him from forming the requisite specific state of mind.
Id (footnote omitted). See Moore, Responsibiliy and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REx. 1563
(1980) (extended discussion of the unconscious and its function in criminal law).
205. See supra notes 177-193 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. See also Keaszy & Sales, An Emperical Investi-
gation of Young Children's Awareness and Usage of Intentionalt'ty in Criminal Situations, I LAW & HUM.
BEHAv. 45 (1977).
207. However, the proposed model rejects the California variant set forth in People v. Nich-
ols, 88 Cal. App. 2d 221, 198 P.2d 538 (1948). See also supra note 182. That approach departs
from a technical mens rea analysis by interjecting notions of diminished responsibility. Under
the California doctrine, courts admit evidence portraying the defendant as less capable in a
moral sense to form the requisite mens rea. As observed by Arenella, supra note 61, at 831, "the
diminished capacity variant is, in essence, the diminished responsibility model in mens rea
clothing." Accord, Morse, supra note 32, at 288. See also Dix, supra note 61, at 328 (a creative
approach to enlargement of the mens rea inquiry).
208. STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY , supra note 12, Standard 3.1.
209. Additionally, the Standards commentary posits that "[I]ts impact will be predictably
modest, since nearly all of the traditional offenses require proof of mens rea . . . . [B]ecause
strict liability is most commonly used in a regulatory context, juveniles are unlikely to be
charged with such offenses." Id at 28.
210. See supra note 159 indicating judicial approval of this concept in other responsibility
contexts.
211. By way of illustration, consider the example of an adult charged with the offense of
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b. Partial Responsibility
Despite cogent arguments in support of a partial responsibility doctrine
in the adult justice system,21 2 the rationale is inapposite to juvenile justice.
In the adult system, the doctrine mitigates punishment for the sane but im-
paired offender by reducing the grade of the offense. Without this type of
ameliorative mechanism, the less culpable but sane defendant is subject to
the identical punishment reserved for the fully responsible offender.
2 3
These premises are invalid in the juvenile system. Sanctions are indi-
vidualized according to a number of social, psychological, and criminologi-
cal factors; the grade of the offense, although influential, is not determinative
of the ultimate consequences. 21 4 Adherence to the IJA-ABA Standards' prin-
ciple that culpability be included in the dispositional calculus will provide
adequate protection to the partially impaired juvenile. 21 5 Moreover, the ex-
panded dispositional culpability doctrine, which is proposed in the following
section,2 1 6 offers superior ameliorative advantages to the impaired juvenile.
2. Infancy and Insanity
For purposes of this analysis, the parallel responsibility doctrines of in-
fancy and insanity are combined. These doctrines share the common pur-
pose of exculpation based on specified incapacities.
Essentially, criminal law authorities propose two models of incorporat-
ing criminal law responsibility principles into delinquency adjudication.
The "adult-equivalency" model adopts intact the criminal law theory. The
applicable adult standard and accompanying practices are transferred to the
juvenile system. The alternative proposal, the "substituted protections"
model, repudiates the adult standards and recommends a substitute theory
with accompanying procedures recast for juvenile justice. The goal of this
model is to achieve constitutional fairness within the framework of juvenile
justice.
The "substituted protections" model is not only preferable in terms of
reckless burning or exploding as set forth by the MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(2) (Approved
Draft 1962). The prohibition requires that the defendant "purposely start[s] a fire or causes an
explosion." If purpose is not proven by the evidence and the defendant is shown to be merely
negligent, the defendant is acquitted. Surely, automatic commitment for social control pur-
poses would be objectionable.
If the evidence adduced during the trial, however, indicated that the juvenile was depen-
dent and neglected or mentally ill, the court should be authorized to order further observation
for purposes of considering alternative jurisdictional bases for treatment.
212. See generally Morse, supra note 32.
213. In adult criminal law, penal consequences are correlated with the grade of offense.
Although the sentencing tribunal is typically granted discretion to adjust the sanction within
the grade, its flexibility may be limited. This is particularly true in homicide prosecutions in
which the most serious grades offer little sentencing flexibility and bear serious consequences.
The development of partial responsibility as a homicide doctrine is partially due to this
restricted flexibility. See Dix, supra note 61, at 321-24.
214. See supra note 171.
215. STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DEUNQUENCY, supra note 12, Standard 1.1(D).
Although the Standards introduce the concept of determinancy into juvenile sanctions, the aim
is to limit disproportionate consequences based on treatment notions. The Standards encourage
the use of diminished culpability evidence in selecting an individualized disposition.
216. See infta notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
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policy, but also satisfies constitutional requirements. 2 17 The juvenile court,
notwithstanding the commendable achievements of due process reform, re-
mains a unique social institution. The juvenile court's specialized task de-
mands a discriminating jurisprudence because it is not dealing with
miniature adults but children experiencing distinct developmental phases.
Blindly engrafting criminal law doctrines on the juvenile system does not
ensure fulfillment of the interests of children or society.
Responsibility principles for juveniles should encompass a wide spec-
trum of incapacities. Restricting responsibility to orthodox expressions of
mental disorder and intellectual impairment subverts fundamental princi-
ples of juvenile law. Juvenile justice doctrine espouses a qualified free-choice
model of conduct 21 8 and recognizes the "unique physical, psychological, and
social features of young persons."'21 9 Therefore, proof of any incapacity di-
minishing the juvenile's ability to morally appreciate delinquency prohibi-
tions220 or to volitionally conform with the dictates of law 22 1 merits formal
attention.
Although responsibility principles affecting exculpation are generally
applied at adjudication, the practice is not sacrosanct. It is based on particu-
lar notions of the function of the criminal law, 2 2 2 concepts less compelling in
juvenile jurisprudence. 22 3 It is submitted that the transfer of responsibility
determinations to the dispositional phase of delinquency extends more effec-
tive protection to the juvenile. In this manner, incapacity due to infancy or
insanity may be introduced as evidence of lack of culpability to appropri-
ately temper social control consequences.
The essence of this "substituted protections" model is routine considera-
tion at disposition of proffered evidence indicating the presence or absence of
moral appreciation and volition. Moreover, to ensure a fair and cognizable
217. The Supreme Court is disinclined to include responsibility principles within its concept
of due process. Even the most optimistic advocates of a constitutional law of criminal responsi-
bility are reserved in their judgment of Supreme Court willingness to entertain the argument.
See, e.g., Wales, supra note 122, at 702-04. Although state courts and the juvenile decisions
reported supra text accompanying notes 126-50 support the incorporation of responsibility into
due process, Supreme Court precedent does not encourage this view point.
218. Seegeneraly STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, Stan-
dards 1.1, 3.5.
219. Id Standard 1.1(D).
220. The source of the incapacity may be a mental disorder or a developmental disability.
The emphasis of the criterion should be upon the quality of the functional impairment; thus,
restriction to a particular origin is unwarranted.
221. Satisfaction of this criterion may be achieved by reference to social and cultural influ-
ences. See supra note 51. "Adverse social and subcultural background is statistically more crimi-
nogenic than is psychosis; like insanity, it also severely circumscribes the freedom of choice
... (emphasis in original). Morris, supra note 51, at 520. Diamond, supra note 51, at 203,
emphasizes that "[t]he evidence would have to be specific to the defendant, directly related to
his thinking and decisional capacities in the context of the crime of which he is charged."
222. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 16, § 36, at 269-74. See also Monahan, supra
note 44 (expanded discussion of insanity rationale).
223. See IJA-ABA STANDARDS RELATION TO DIsPOSITIONS, supra note 194, at 15-20. Al-
though delinquency jurisprudence has adopted criminal law concepts, notable distinctions re-
main. Retribution and deterrence, linchpins to the insanity doctrine, are accorded diminished
significance in delinquency jurisprudence. The theory ofjuvenile delinquency control, whether
defined by traditional notions or by the revised IJA-ABA Standards, lacks the punitive empha-
sis of the criminal law.
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result, the court should be required to incorporate the culpability determina-
tion into its dispositional order. After evaluating the culpability evidence, if
the court decides that responsibility was impaired to a substantial degree,
22 4
the court should be obligated to impose civil treatment sanctions. 225 Lesser
impairments evidencing a "diminished responsibility" should merit disposi-
tion within the ordinary range of delinquency sanctions but encumbered by
a social control discount proportionate to the reduction in culpability.
226
Although the "substituted protections" model is contrary to the general
weight of authority, particularly in the insanity defense context, its advan-
tages are distinct. Its expanded scope avoids the artificial limits of the medi-
cal model and permits the introduction of any evidence probative of
incapacity. By authorizing a set of dispositional authorities correlated with
levels of impairment, the model provides flexibility to the juvenile court.
2 27
The substantially impaired juvenile is treated as a non-delinquent and re-
ceives appropriate care without reference to the preventive detention proce-
dure used by the adult system. 228 Although continuing to be adjudicated as
a delinquent, the partially impaired juvenile receives a sanction adjusted to
his degree of culpability.
22 9
C. Concluding Remarks
Just results may be attained by adoption of this integrated theory of
delinquency responsibility. Unless proof of mens rea and actus reus are es-
tablished beyond a reasonable doubt, the impaired juvenile is not liable for
his misconduct. If, however, liability is imposed, additional safeguards pro-
vide protection for the juvenile. Culpability becomes an organizing princi-
ple of dispositional decisionmaking, and separate judicial treatment is
available to juveniles displaying a broad spectrum of incapacities.
The aim of this integrated theory is to establish balanced principles ac-
commodating individual and societal interests in a manner responsive to
both constitutional and policy interests. The unification of these principles
224. In effect, this standard is the equivalent of the IJA-ABA Standards' measure of inca-
pacity. See STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, supra note 12, Standard 3.5.
225. See the approach adopted in In re C.W.M., 407 A.2d 617 (D.C. 1979) discussed supra
notes 149-150 and accompanying text. Other civil remedies may also be utilized, such as the
substitution of non-delinquency jurisdictional authorities. Seesupra note 159 and accompanying
text.
226. To the degree that delinquency codes adopt the proportionality recommendations of
the IJA-ABA Standards and similar proposals, this concept gains increased importance. As in
the adult system, the grade of offense will regulate the range of penal consequences and the
notion of culpability will assume the pivotal role.
227. See supra note 84. The dilemma conceived by the IJA-ABA Standards approach is
disingenuous. The juvenile justice system is equipped with sufficient dispositional options to
avoid irrational outcomes.
228. STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, Standard 3.5, supra note 12,
adopts the Model Penal Code insanity test, it neglects to specify procedures for disposition of the
juvenile acquitted by this procedure. The drafters presumed that juvenile courts would resort
to procedures similar to those used for adult insanity acquittees. Interview with Standards Re-
porter, supra note 84.
229. Thus, the model responds to the query: "Do legally sane but mentally abnormal of-
fenders deserve the same punishment as normal offenders whose behavior is essentially similar?"
Morse, supra note 32, at 273.
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with the fundamentals of delinquency jurisprudence is essential. Instead of
mechanically adopting adult responsibility doctrines, the proposed model
utilizes the principles founded in the juvenile justice system. Despite diver-
gence from the principles of adult criminal law, the model fulfills the consti-
tutional standard of fundamental fairness. Moreover, the model's
integrative quality offers the potential benefits of minimizing doctrinal dis-
tortion and avoiding ad hoc results.
